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ANALYZING JUROR BIAS EXHIBITED DURING
VOIR DIRE IN WISCONSIN: HOW TO LESSEN
THE CONFUSION
I. INTRODUCTION
The voir dire process has long been recognized as essential to a jury
trial. "Voir dire is the process by which lawyers and litigants obtain
information about the potential jurors."1 Unfortunately, the voir dire
process is imperfect. Some jurors do not disclose various biases and
thus, parties may be prejudiced at trial. Additionally, jurors who exhibit
honest responses that appear biased in voir dire sometimes are not
struck for cause simply because a judge does not believe the juror will
fail to be impartial. Hence, a very difficult and controversial question
results: When should a reviewing court overturn a decision because a
judge erroneously struck or did not strike a juror for cause?
Wisconsin courts have answered this question in varying manners.
Part II of this Comment discusses the past standards applied by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court in evaluating juror bias. Part III addresses
specific Wisconsin Supreme Court cases governing the issues involved in
voir dire. Part IV concludes with an approach appellate courts should
apply in determining whether reversal is necessary and an approach trial
courts should utilize to determine the initial signs of juror bias.
II. THE METHODOLOGY PREVIOUSLY UTILIZED BY WISCONSIN
COURTS WHEN ANALYZING JUROR BIAS
The Wisconsin Supreme Court developed the juror bias standard in
State v. Louis,2 State v. Gesch,3 State v. Ramos,' and State v. Ferron.' This
1. Patrick E. Longan, Civil Trial Reform and the Appearance of Fairness, 79 MARQ. L.
REV. 295, 302-03 (1995). Lawyers frequently conduct voir dire themselves; however, many
courts (especially federal civil courts) conduct voir dire without a lawyer's aid. Id. at 303.
Parties are permitted to challenge jurors in two fashions: (1) challenges for cause and (2)
peremptory challenges. Id. at 307-10. A challenge for cause, illustrated by juror bias, is
difficult to attain. Peremptory challenges, on the other hand, do not require justification, but
are limited by law to a certain number. Id.
2. -457 N.W.2d 484 (Wis. 1990).
3. 482 N.W.2d 99 (Wis. 1992).
4. 564 N.W.2d 328 (Wis. 1997).
5. 579 N.W.2d 654 (Wis. 1998).
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part of the Comment will outline the reasoning and terminology utilized
by the court in these decisions.
A. State v. Louis
In State v. Louis, the court held that two jurors were capable of
impartiality based upon the circuit court's discretion.6 In Louis, the jury
found the defendant guilty of armed robbery On appeal, the defense
argued that at trial Louis was deprived of his right to an impartial jury
because the trial court refused to strike two jurors for cause. Both
members of the jury in contention were Milwaukee Police officers;
therefore, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had to decide if the officers
were biased in a criminal trial.9 Both police officers were questioned
individually in the ciicuit court in a special voir dire."0 The exchange
involved the following conversation:
THE COURT: And you are Gilbert Adams?
[OFFICER ADAMS]: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: How do you know Mr. LaPorte?
[OFFICER ADAMS]: Milwaukee police officer.
THE COURT: Do you see him regularly?
[OFFICER ADAMS]: Periodically throughout the year.
THE COURT: Where do you work? Do you work in the
Department?
[OFFICER ADAMS]: Training Bureau.
THE COURT: Would it make any difference to you if Mr.
LaPorte were a witness in this case, or could you
assess his testimony along with everybody else's?
[OFFICER ADAMS]: It wouldn't make any difference ...
6. 457 N.W.2d at 486.
7. Id. at 487.
8. Id. at 485. Defendant argued that he was forced to use two peremptory challenges to
strike the members from the jury. Id.
9. See id. at 486-90.
10. Id. at 486.
11. Id. The above questions were directed to officer Adams and an almost identical set
of questions were presented to the second officer, Detective John Wesley. See id. Detective
Wesley also responded in the same manner. See id. Following these exchanges, the defense
moved to have the two officers removed for cause. See id. The circuit judge denied the
motion; however, after more Milwaukee police officers were presented as potential witnesses,
the circuit court again questioned Adams and Wesley. See id. at 486-87. Subsequently, the
circuit court denied the motions to strike for cause. Id. at 487.
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The defense argued this exchange should have necessitated a strike
for cause."
On review, the Wisconsin Supreme Court described the jury bias
and noted that "prospective jurors are presumed impartial;" therefore,
the party raising a bias issue "bears the burden of proving bias."13 The
court stated that "even the appearance of bias must be avoided" and
"bias may be either implied as a matter of law or actual in fact."'14 The
court elaborated by stating that the question of bias and dismissal for
cause is purely a matter of circuit court discretion.15 The Louis court
also stated, "[a] determination by the circuit court that a prospective
juror can be impartial should be overturned, only where bias is
'manifest.' 
"16
The court carefully analyzed the appellant's two arguments. First,
the appellant argued that police officers were "implicitly" biased by the
nature of their occupation.7 Second, the appellant argued that the
officers were "actually" biased because they knew the witnesses."' The
court quickly disagreed with the first argument because both the United
States Supreme Court and the Wisconsin Supreme Court had not, in the
past, excluded groups of persons as a matter of law.19
The Louis court again stressed the importance of the circuit court's
discretion to determine "actual" bias by deciding that the record
unequivocally reflected the officers belief that they were impartial.
The court cautioned, "[w]hile such expressions are not conclusive,
evaluating the subjective sincerity of those expressions is a matter of the
circuit court's discretion. The circuit court concluded that Officer
Adams and Detective Wesley could decide the case fairly and
impartially, without bias, based solely upon the evidence presented." 
21
12. Id.
13. Id. (citing Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961); McGeever v. State, 300 N.W. 485,
489 (Wis. 1941)).
14. Id. at 487-88 (citing United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133 (1936); State v. Wyss,
370 N.W.2d 745 (Wis. 1985)).
15. Id. at 488 (citing Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 511 (1948); Nyberg v. State,
249 N.W.2d 524 (Wis. 1977)).
16. Id. (citing Irvin, 366 U.S. at 723; Hammill v. State, 278 N.W.2d 821 (Wis. 1979)).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. (citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215-17 (1982); Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722-23;
Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 168, 172 (1950); Frazier, 335 U.S. at 513 (1948); Wood,
299 U.S. at 149; State v. Sarinske, 280 N.W.2d 725 (1979); McGeever, 300 N.W. at 489).
20. Id. at 490.
21. Id. (citation omitted).
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B. State v. Gesch
In State v. Gesch, the Wisconsin Supreme Court overturned a circuit
court decision pertaining to a challenge for cause during voir dire.2 In
Gesch, the State charged the defendant with criminal trespass to a
medical facility.23 At Gesch's trial, Officer Wineke was a potential
witness for the State.24 During voir dire, prospective juror Daniel
Wineke indicated he and Officer Wineke were brothers.2 The circuit
court proceeded to question juror Wineke to determine whether he
could be impartial.26  The court concluded that the juror was not
"actually" biased.27
The Wisconsin Supreme Court did not agree with the lower court's
holding.2 Basing its decision upon principles set forth previously in
Louis, the Gesch court overturned the circuit courtY.2  However, the
court stressed the importance of circuit court discretion regarding a
juror's demeanor and sincerity.30 The court held that "implied" bias
exists when "a prospective juror is related to a state witness by blood or
marriage to the third degree. ,M Therefore, despite the non-existence of
"actual" bias, the Wisconsin Supreme Court overturned the lower court
decision based upon "implied" bias.32 The court wrote that "special
problems exist that render a circuit court's search for actual bias an
inadequate protection of a defendant's right to an impartial jury. One
such problem is the potential for unconscious bias. "33
C. State v. Ramos
In State v. Ramos, the use of a peremptory challenge to strike a juror
when a challenge for cause had been inappropriately denied led to
22. State v. Gesch, 482 N.W.2d 99, 104 (Wis. 1992).
23. Id. at 100.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 100-01.
27. Id. at 102. The circuit judge stated that based upon juror Wineke's demeanor and
sincerity, his suspicions of Wineke's familial bias were diminished. Id.
28. Id. at 102.
29. See id. at 101-02.
30. Id. at 102; see also State v. Louis, 457 N.W.2d 484 (Wis. 1990).
31. Gesch, 482 N.W.2d at 102.
32. Id. at 102-03.
33. Id. The court held that it is impossible for a prospective juror to estimate how a
familial relationship with a witness will affect judgment. See id. at 102. Regardless of
sincerity, this is a situation in which a category of potential jurors, relatives, must be
disqualified based upon an "unconscious bias." Id. at 102-03.
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automatic reversal upon review? Ramos admitted to killing a child;
however, he argued that the killing was reckless and requested a jury
trial. 5 During the defense counsel's questioning of a potential juror,
that juror admitted it was possible that she could not be impartial to the
defendant 6 She stated, "[Ijust knowing that the child was suffocated, I
guess I couldn't be fair. " 37 Ramos's counsel moved to strike that juror
for cause, but the judge denied the motion as well as subsequent
requests by defense counsel for a review of the record.*
Defense counsel removed the juror by using its first peremptory
strike; therefore, the juror did not participate in the jury that found
Ramos guilty.39  Ramos appealed to the court of appeals, which
overturned his conviction based upon a violation of his due process
rights as defined by Wisconsin law." The State appealed, but the
Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court.'
The court looked at other states' laws and previous Wisconsin
decisions, such as Gesch, to conclude that the peremptory challenge
should not correct a trial court error. In essence, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that a circuit court error in not issuing a challenge
for cause which led to the waste of a peremptory challenge results in an
automatic reversal.43 Ramos made clear that a challenge for cause must
be scrutinized more heavily by appellate courts.
D. State v. Ferron
In State v. Ferron," the Wisconsin Supreme Court attempted to
diminish the confusion by defining juror bias for appellate courts.
Ferron and Nelson were charged with being parties to the crime of
burglary.45 Both Ferron's and Nelson's counsel asked a potential juror a
34. 564 N.W.2d 328,329 (Wis. 1997).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 330.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 331-32. The court compared the differences between Wisconsin law and
Oklahoma law, which requires a party to use a peremptory challenge to correct a trial court
error. Id.
43. Id. at 332-34.
44. 579 N.W.2d 654 (Wis. 1998).
45. Id. at 656.
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series of questions."' The following exchange took place between
Nelson's attorney, Fitzgerald, and two prospective jurors:
MR. FITZGERALD:... I'm going to argue that the State
hasn't provided proof beyond a reasonable doubt that
Mr. Nelson is guilty of anything.
Now, keeping that in mind, I may instruct Mr. Nelson that I don't
think that he has to take the witness stand. And what I
wonder is would any of you think to yourself, well,
you're saying the State's case is lousy, but you
didn't even have your guy testify so what does that
make your case? Yes, Mr. Metzler.
JUROR JAMES METZLER: Well, if your client is innocent,
why wouldn't he take the stand?
MR. FITZGERALD: Because the constitution doesn't
say he has to.
JUROR JAMES METZLER: Well, if he's innocent, why
wouldn't he go up there and tell us he's innocent?
MR. FITZGERALD: Well, without getting into a long
exchange about the constitutional rights that we all
have, I can only tell you that the Court will instruct
you that a defendant has the absolute right to decline
to talk to the jury, to talk to the police, to talk to
people investigating the crime, and that it might be
my advice to him he need not take the stand. And is
your questioning an indication that you would hold
that against him?
JUROR JAMES METZLER: I think I may.
MR. FITZGERALD: You think you may.
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, here's the instruction. A
defendant in a criminal case has the absolute constitutional right
not to testify. The defendant's decision not to testify must not be
considered by you in any way and must not influence
your verdict in any manner. Is there anyone here who cannot
follow or would not follow that instruction?
JUROR M.C. CLARK: I would wonder, like he said, why,
you know, if he had nothing to hide?
46. Id.
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THE COURT: I understand.
JUROR M.C. CLARK: Why he would do that? ...
THE COURT:... The question is your opinion so strong or
your belief so strong you're not willing to set those aside for the
purpose of this case and follow the law that I've given you?
JUROR JAMES METZLER: Well, I would certainly try to set it
aside.
THE COURT: Miss Clark?
JUROR M.C. CLARK: I would try to set it aside, but I'm
not sure I could completely set that aside if that would be in the
back of my mind that they didn't take the stand. That would be
kind of back there knowing that, you know-
THE COURT: ... [E]vidence as it comes out in the courtroom,
not things that didn't happen. That's the point. Can you do did
[sic] that?
JUROR M.C. CLARK: I'm not so sure I could.
THE COURT: Mr. Metzler, can you?
JUROR JAMES METZLER: Probably.47
The circuit court excused Clark from the jury; however, Ferron used one
peremptory strike to remove juror Metzler.4 Ferron appealed after his
conviction and the court of appeals reversed.49 The court of appeals
held that:
[T]he circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by failing
to strike Metzler for cause because his answers revealed that he
was not indifferent as required by Wis. Stat. § 805.08(1). The
court of appeals also held that the circuit court failed to follow
the directive... that a motion to strike a juror for cause must be
granted whenever the court reasonably suspects that
circumstances outside the evidence will influence the juror.'
The court of appeals held that, based on Ramos, the failure to strike
a juror for cause resulted in reversible error.51 Upon review, the
47. Id. at 656-57.
48. Id. at 657.
49. Id. at 658 (citing State v. Ferron, 570 N.W.2d 883 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997)).
50. Id. (citation omitted) (citing Ferron, 570 N.W.2d at 883; Nyberg v. State, 249 N.W.2d
524 (Wis. 1977)).
51. See Ferron, 579 N.W.2d at 658-59. For discussion regarding the Ramos standard and
holding, see supra Part I.C.
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Wisconsin Supreme Court was faced with the task of modifying the bias
standard.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court first set aside the proposition that a
trial court must honor challenges for cause whenever it "reasonably
suspect[s]" outside evidence created bias. 2 The court cautioned and
encouraged circuit courts to strike prospective jurors when a
"reasonable suspicion" of bias exists; however, appellate courts are not
required to overturn circuit court decisions regarding impartiality
whenever a reasonable suspicion is evidenced. 3
Most importantly, the court clarified the "manifest" bias standard set
forth in Ramos, because that standard caused more scrutiny by a circuit
court with regard to a challenge for cause. '  The court set out the
following two-part test:
[A] prospective juror's bias is "manifest" whenever a review of
the record: (1) does not support a finding that the prospective
juror is a reasonable person who is sincerely willing to [set] aside
an opinion or prior knowledge; or (2) does not support a finding
that a reasonable person in the juror's position could set aside
the opinion or prior knowledge.5
The first prong allows the circuit court to determine the demeanor
and sincerity of a prospective juror.5 The second prong tells the
appellate courts how to determine if, under the circumstances, no
reasonable juror could put aside the bias evident in the record. 7
Despite the value placed upon circuit court discretion, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court applied this test and overturned the circuit court's
holding. 8 The court was not satisfied with the "probably" response that
juror Metzler gave after numerous questions and explanations
pertaining to the Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-
incrimination. 9 The court also wrote:
52. Ferron, 579 N.W.2d at 659. See also Nyberg, 249 N.W.2d at 524 (The Nyberg
standard of "reasonable suspicion" eventually had become a command to a circuit court).
53. Ferron, 579 N.W.2d at 663 (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 661; see also supra Part I.C.
55. Ferron, 579 N.W.2d at 661.
56. Id.
57. See id. Again, the court stressed that the circuit court must be given wide latitude in
their determination of bias. See id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 662.
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Indeed, that Metzler's explicit bias was hinged upon Ferron's
Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination is of
considerable importance in this case .... [O]ur decision in this
case may have been different-given the same record-had
Metzler exhibited a bias which did not conflict with such an
essential constitutional right.'
Both Justice Geske and Justice Bradley dissented in the Ferron
decision.6' In Part I of her dissent, Justice Bradley agreed with the
majority's two-prong test because it acknowledged the importance of a
circuit court's discretion.62 However, she disagreed with the majority's
application of the test when she wrote, "[t]his is a case where, based on
extensive questioning, legal instruction, and first-hand assessment of
Metzler's comments, the circuit court determined that the juror was
willing to put aside his bias."' Justice Bradley believed the "[m]anifest"
bias found by the majority in juror Metzler's responses actually violated
the two-prong test because it overlooked the circuit court's discretion.'
Also, in Part I of Justice Bradley's dissent, she criticized the majority
for its reliance upon the Fifth Amendment as justification for reversal.'
Bradley believed that the majority gave the Fifth Amendment special
treatment; the majority ignored the importance of the fundamental
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. 6
III. How WISCONSIN COURTS PRESENTLY ANALYZE BIAS
During the summer of 1999, the Wisconsin Supreme Court utilized
the following terms to describe juror bias: "statutory" bias, "subjective"
bias, and "objective" bias.67 Specifically, this part of the Comment
addresses the Wisconsin Supreme Court cases of State v. Faucher, 6 State
v. Mendoza,69 State v. Erickson," and State v. Kiernan.7'
60. Id.
61. Id. at 664-68.
62. Id. at 665.
63. Id
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 667. Justice Geske also joined in Part I of Justice Bradley's dissent. Id. at 668.
67. State v. Faucher, 596 N.W.2d 770 (Wis. 1999).
68. Id.
69. 596 N.W.2d 736 (Wis. 1999).
70. 596 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 1999).
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A. State v. Faucher
In State v. Faucher, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin defined bias
which may result in removal for cause.' Three areas of bias exist: 1) the
juror is statutorily biased; 2) the juror is subjectively biased; or 3) the
juror is objectively biased.73
In Faucher, the defendant was charged with the second-degree
sexual assault of a nursing home patient at a facility where the
defendant was employed.74 The State presented Paulette Hayes,
another nursing home employee, who testified that the defendant
fondled the patient's breasts. 5 Hayes became the State's key witness,
and, thus, the only true issue became whether the jury found Hayes
credible. 6 At the close of the State's case, a juror, David Kaiser, alerted
the court that he knew Hayes.'
The circuit court initiated a special voir dire that only pertained to
juror Kaiser.7 ' Kaiser stated that Hayes had been his next door neighbor
and he was her acquaintance.79 Kaiser also stated, "I know she's a
person of integrity, and I know she wouldn't lie."' 0 The prosecutor
asked Kaiser if he could put aside his knowledge of facts and details, and
decide the case only based upon the trial itself.8 Kaiser responded
affirmatively.'
Subsequently, the defense counsel moved to strike juror Kaiser;
however, the circuit court did not have any alternate jurors.3 After
consideration, the court dismissed juror Kaiser and allowed the trial to
71. 596 N.W.2d 760 (Wis. 1999).
72. See generally Faucher, 596 N.W. 2d 770.
73. Id. at 777-80.
74. Id. at 773.
75. Id.
76. Id. The prosecutor argued in closing argument that if Hayes could be believed, the
defendant must be convicted. See id.
77. Id. at 774. Apparently, juror Kaiser did not know initially in voir dire that Hayes
was a witness. See id. Nor did Kaiser recognize her name on the witness list, because she had
recently been married and changed her name. See id.
78. Id. at 774.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 774-75. Defense counsel also asked Kaiser if he could set aside his opinion
regarding Hayes. See id. at 775. Again, Kaiser answered in the affirmative. Id.
83. Id. Defense counsel also moved for a mistrial because the court did not have an
alternate juror. Id. The court denied this motion and held another special voir dire for
Kaiser. Id. The second voir dire disclosed that Kaiser had told other jurors he knew a
witness, but he did not disclose who or in what manner he knew the witness. Id.
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proceed with an eleven-person jury.' The eleven jurors returned a
guilty verdict and the defendant was convicted.' The defendant filed a
motion for post-conviction relief based on the circuit court's error when
it neglected to strike Kaiser for cause.' The court again denied the
defendant's motion for a new trialY
On review, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin addressed the issue of
bias in a different manner than had been done in the past. The court
stated:
In addition to reviewing the issue presented, we also take the
opportunity this case affords us to clarify our jury bias
jurisprudence .... From these cases we have come to recognize
that our past decisions in this area of law have to a degree lacked
the clarity necessary to properly guide the bench and bar in the
appropriate examination of prospective jurors for evidence of
bias. We believe that the resulting confusion stems from our
inconsistent, and at times imprecise, use of the terms "implied,"
"actual" and "inferred" to describe a juror's bias."
Based upon Wisconsin statutes, the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, the Wisconsin
Constitution, and review of jury bias cases, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court redefined juror bias terminology.Y The terms now used are
"statutory," "objective" and "subjective" biasY
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's conviction and order denying
post-conviction relief and remanded the case for a new trial. Id. The appellate court based
it's decision primarily upon Gesch. In Gesch, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that while a
prospective juror related to a State witness by blood or by marriage may not have actual bias,
there still exists a great risk of an "unconscious bias." Id. The appellate court concluded that
Kaiser was biased as a matter of law, because his assurance of impartiality was outweighed by
an obvious bias illustrated by his responses to voir dire questions. Id. at 775-76.
88. Id. at 773.
89. Id. at 777.
90. Id. The court stated that the "new" terms are not necessarily meant to correspond to
the former terminology. Id. at 777-78. However, the court stated, "we do acknowledge that
subjective bias is most closely akin to what we had called actual bias, and that objective bias
in some ways contemplates both our use of the terms implied and inferred bias. Id. But
because the case law does not always use the former terms in a consistent manner, there is not
an absolute, direct correlation between the former terms and the terms we adopt today." Id.
at 778.
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1. Statutory Bias
Statutory bias is based upon Wisconsin Statute Section 805.08(1).91 The
statute lists the following categories of jurors as biased: a juror "related
by blood or marriage to any party or to any attorney appearing in the
case;" a juror having "any financial interest in the case;" a juror who
"has expressed or formed any opinion;" or a juror who is "aware of any
bias or prejudice in the case. '" However, the court in Faucher only
deemed those related by blood or marriage to the defendant or an
attorney in the case, or those jurors having a financial interest in the
case as statutorily biased.93
The court wrote:
Although § 805.08(1) also speaks of those prospective jurors who
have expressed or formed any opinion or are aware of any bias
or prejudice in the case, these persons are not those to whom the
term "statutorily biased" applies. These persons are more
accurately described as those for whom evidence of "subjective
bias" exists.94
The court also noted that statutory bias is the most easily described
form of juror bias.95
2. Subjective Bias
Subjective bias is revealed through the words and demeanor of the
potential juror.96 Similar to "actual bias," subjective bias is based upon
the record from the voir dire proceeding.' Although direct proof may
not prove subjective bias, a prospective juror's demeanor which
indicates state of mind can illustrate subjective bias.98
The court cautioned appellate courts that subjective bias turns upon
91. WIS. STAT. § 805.08(1) (1999).
92. Id.
93. Faucher, 596 N.W.2d at 778.
94. Id. (citing State v. Delgado, 588 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1999)).
95. Id. at 778. Although the court stated that statutory bias is easily described, it failed
to further define what "financial interest in the case" by a juror means.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. The court was careful to note that it is rare for a prospective juror to simply state
that they are biased. Id. More often the situation is not this simple; therefore, a circuit court
is given great deference in determining subjective bias from demeanor. Id. A circuit court
will not be overturned unless its ruling is found to be clearly erroneous. Id.
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a juror's responses in voir dire and a circuit judge's findings regarding
credibility, honesty, and other relevant factors." The court reasoned
that because a circuit court is in a "superior position" to evaluate bias
than an appellate court is, most circuit courts' decisions are sufficient to
protect a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury."
3. Objective Bias
A judge utilizing the objective bias standard need not attempt to
judge the mentality of an individual juror.' l Similar to other areas of
the law, this analysis of objectivity is based upon the reasonable person
standard: "[w]hether the reasonable person in the individual prospective
juror's position could be impartial.'0 This is a mixed question of law
and fact because a circuit court must consider the "circumstances
surrounding the voir dire and the facts involved" in the specific case. 3
The analysis also remains a question of law, because the trial judge must
determine whether a reasonable person in the juror's shoes could
remain unbiased. 1"
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the circuit court is well
positioned to determine objective bias because it has a special
understanding of a juror's specific subjective state of mind, which is
crucial to determining objective bias.' 5
The Wisconsin Supreme Court explained three specific challenges
that must be analyzed through juror bias: (1) "strike for cause;" (2)
"lack of juror candor;" and 3) "extraneous information.' 1 6 In Faucher,
the court addressed the issue of strike for cause.' When it applied the
"new" analysis and terminology, the court determined that juror Kaiser
99. Id.
100. Id. Despite the court's new analysis and terminology pertaining to juror bias, the
court's view that a circuit court has "superior discretion" is consistent with previous holdings
pertaining to juror bias. See generally State v. Gesch, 482 N.W.2d 99 (Wis. 1992).
101. Faucher, 596 N.W.2d at 779.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. The court noted that objective bias has been reviewed by various standards. Id.
The court concluded that because of the mixed law and fact issues involved, the higher court
may still defer to the circuit court. Id. Reversal will only occur if, as a matter of law, a
reasonable judge could not have reached the same conclusion. Id. at 780.
105. Id. at 779 (citing State v. Delgado, 588 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1999)).
106. Id. at 780-83. See also State v. Broomfield, 589 N.W.2d 225 (Wis. 1999); State v.
Gesch, 482 N.W.2d 99 (Wis. 1999); State v. Ferron, 579 N.W.2d 654 (Wis. 1998); Delgado, 588
N.W.2d at 1; State v. Messelt, 518 N.W.2d 232 (Wis. 1994); State v. Louis 457 N.W.2d 484
(Wis. 1990); State v. Wyss, 370 N.W.2d 745 (Wis. 1985).
107. Faucher, 596 N.W.2d at 780.
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was "objectively" biased.'"' The court determined this by first analyzing
"subjective bias.""
The Wisconsin Supreme Court indicated that the circuit court
correctly assessed that Kaiser was willing to set aside his views about the
key witness in determining the outcome of the case and was, therefore,
not subjectively biased."' However, the court held that despite its
deference to a circuit court's bias determination, the trial court failed to
consider if Kaiser was "objectively" biased."' The court reviewed the
record and noted that Kaiser had explained that witness Hayes was his
next door neighbor and "a girl of integrity.""' Kaiser had made it clear
that based upon his opinion of Hayes he was sure she would not lie."3
Therefore, based upon the "strength" of Kaiser's opinion and the fact
that Hayes' testimony was pivotal in the case, the court held juror
Kaiser to be objectively biased.1 14
B. State v. Mendoza
In State v. Mendoza, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
although the circuit court erred in dismissing a juror, such error need
not result in an automatic reversal of the circuit court's decision."5
Mendoza was charged with possession of cocaine and intent to deliver."'
After the initial jury examination, five jurors were examined more
carefully in chambers."7  Four of the prospective jurors had been
convicted of crimes, and one had a family member who had committed a
drug offense."'
The four jurors were struck for cause because of their criminal
connections."9 Mendoza argued that the effect of striking the four
108. Id. at 785.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 784. The court noted that this was consistent with Ferron, where a juror was
not sincerely willing to set aside bias. Id. Instead, Faucher demonstrated a situation where a
juror unequivocally stated that he would abide by the law. Id. It appears that the court
intertwined the Ferron standard with the new "objective" and "subjective" terminology. See
id. at 784-85.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 785.
113. Id. at 786.
114. Id. at 785-86.
115. 596 N.W.2d 736,749 (Wis. 1999).
116. Id. at 738-39.
117. Id. at 739.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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jurors was to give the state four extra peremptory challenges.'o The
Wisconsin Supreme Court disagreed and held that the circuit court's
erroneous dismissal of one of the four jurors was not enough to reverse
the conviction.2 The error was deemed harmless and not similar to the
situation in Ramos.l"  Therefore, automatic reversal was not
warranted."23
C. State v. Erickson
In State v. Erickson, the Wisconsin Supreme Court did not reverse
the defendant's conviction, holding that the lower court properly
refused to strike a juror for cause.124 The defendant was convicted of
child enticement and sentenced to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole." Erickson sought post-conviction relief because
he had not received all his peremptory strikes."6 The circuit court held
that, according to Ramos, prejudice was assumed and Erickson was
entitled to a new trial.27 The State appealed this automatic reversal, and
Erickson cross-appealed the circuit court's refusal to strike for cause one
juror who had been sexually assaulted."
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that Ramos only compels
automatic reversal when "a circuit court, after the defendant has
challenged a juror for cause, incorrectly concludes that the juror does
not need to be removed for cause... [and] the defendant uses
peremptory strikes to correct a circuit court error. ..."'2' Accordingly,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that bias must be left to the circuit
court's discretion because the circuit court is in the best position to
120. Id. at 746. Mendoza argued that the group of four jurors should not have been
categorically struck for cause, and that this resulted in four "free" challenges for the benefit
of the state. See id. This was the opposite situation from Ramos, where jurors should have
been struck for cause but were not. See id.
121. Id. at 749. One of the four jurors had such remote ties to the criminal world that
the Wisconsin Supreme Court felt he should not have been struck. Id. at 745.
122. Id. at 749.
123. Id
124. See generally 596 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 1999).
125. Id. at 752-53.
126. Id. at 753-54. Erickson also argued that he was subjected to ineffective assistance of
counsel because the circuit court error was not preserved for appeal. Id. at 754.
127. Id
128. Id.
129. Id. at 757. The court explained, "Ramos stands for nothing more and we decline to
expand its reach beyond those facts." Id.
2000]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
observe a juror's true behavior.'9
The court further held that automatic reversal was not proper
because the circuit court did not err by refusing to strike a sexual assault
victim.' The assault was far removed and the demeanor of the juror
could only be properly assessed by a circuit court.'32
D. State v. Kiernan
In State v. Kiernan, the circuit court was reversed when the
Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
which held that the challenged jurors were objectively biased.'3 3 The
defendant was arrested and charged with operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of an intoxicant, violating a permissible breath
concentration.' 3 When the prospective jurors entered the courtroom,
Kiernan's attorney realized that five members had served two days
earlier in almost exactly the same type of case.3 In both cases defense
counsel argued that objects "placed in the mouth, such as denture
adhesive," that absorb alcohol result in inaccurate readings.'3
The trial continued over the defense counsel's objections to the
jurors in question.3 7  The jury convicted Kiernan on two counts. 38
Based upon Ferron, the court of appeals held that reasonable jurors in
the five jurors' positions could not set aside their views or prior
knowledge about the breathalyzer. 19  The Wisconsin Supreme Court
began its review of the Kiernan case by summarizing precedent
beginning with Ramos, noting that deprivation of peremptory strikes
130. Id. at 758 (citing State v. Gesch, 482 N.W.2d 99 (Wis. 1999); State -v. Ferron, 579
N.W.2d 654 (Wis. 1998) (Geske, J., dissenting)).
131. Id. at 760.
132. Id. at 759.
133. 596 N.W.2d 760,761-62 (Wis. 1999).
134. Id. at 762.
135. Id. The court noted the following:
In both cases the State prosecuted a person for driving an automobile while
intoxicated with a breath alcohol content of 0.11. In both cases the State's strongest
evidence was a reading from a breathalyzer machine, the Intoxilyzer 5000, showing
that the defendants' breath alcohol was in excess of the permitted legal limit.
Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 763.
139. Id. For further explanation regarding the Ferron rationale see also supra Part II.D.
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warranted reversal. 14
The majority stressed that since the Ramos decision, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court had faced many bias cases where the issue was whether
court errors in jury selection warranted a new trial, regardless of the
existence of an impartial jury.141 Again, the court summarized the three
types of bias outlined in Faucher, and focused upon subjective and
objective bias in its analysis. 42
Basing its analysis of subjective bias upon Ferron, the court held that
subjective bias was not present because it was too difficult for an
appellate court to discern a juror's beliefs, demeanor, and sincerity,
where no transcript of voir dire exists.' Instead, the court overturned
the circuit court's decision based upon objective bias." The five veteran
jurors did not need to be removed categorically, but the five were found
to be individually, objectively biased.4
Again, having stated the importance of circuit court discretion, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held:
While we normally defer to the conclusions of the circuit court in
objective bias instances, we cannot do so here. On this record, as
a matter of law, the circuit court could not reasonably reach the
conclusion that it reached in this case. The circuit court was
obligated to remove those jurors for cause.'"
E. Subsequent Decisions by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
In State v. Oswald, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals took note of the
four Wisconsin Supreme Court decisions defining juror bias.4
Defendant Oswald and his son robbed a bank, took a woman hostage,
and shot at police.'" The media broadcast the incident and upon trial a
140. Id. at 764 (citing State v. Ramos, 564 N.W.2d 328, 328 (Wis. 1997)).
141. Id. (citing State v. Mendoza, 596 N.W.2d 736 (Wis. 1999); State v. Erickson, 596
N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 1999); State v. Ferron, 579 N.W.2d 654 (Wis. 1998)).
142. Id. (citing State v. Faucher, 596 N.W.2d 770 (Wis. 1999)).
143. Id. at 765 (citing Ferron, 579 N.W.2d 654 (Bradley, J., dissenting)).
144. Id. at 766.
145. Id.
146. See id. at 767.
147. 606 N.W.2d 238, 242-44 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). For additional cases addressing the
present juror bias standard see generally State v. Theno, Nos. 99-2507-CR, 99-2508-CR, 2000
WL 960016 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Hoecherl, Nos. 97-3487-CR, 97-3488-CR, 2000 WL
726568 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Czarnecki, 604 N.W.2d 891 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
148. Oswald, 606 N.W.2d at 242.
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jury convicted Oswald of twenty felony counts. 49 On appeal, Oswald
raised several claims, one of which was juror bias.'
The court summarized the recent Wisconsin Supreme Court
holdings regarding juror bias and noted that two different levels of
deference must be given to the trial court when determining subjective
or objective bias.'5' The clearly erroneous standard must be applied
when a trial court is deciding the issue of subjective bias because the
trial court is in the special position to judge a juror's tone and
demeanor.'5 2 Additionally, the trial court's determination of objective
bias is only reversible when, "as a matter of law, a reasonable judge
could not have reached the same conclusion." '  A higher standard of
review must be used regarding objective bias because "the trial court's
conclusion on the question of law of whether the facts add up to
objective bias is so intertwined with the factual findings supporting that
conclusion. "'14
The court addressed subjective bias initially and noted that,
according to Ferron, "questions as to a prospective juror's sincere
willingness to set aside bias should be largely left to the circuit court's
discretion.""'15 After Ferron and the subsequent juror bias cases a juror
does not need to respond to voir dire questions with "unequivocal
impartiality." 1
56
In determining objective bias, the recent cases illustrate that
objective bias is evident when "direct, critical, personal connections" are
maintained between the juror and critical evidence or issues in the case,
or when the juror has a strong negative attitude toward the criminal
justice system.'57
149. Id.
150. Id. at 242-43.
151. Id. at 243.
152. Id. (citing State v. Kiernan, 596 N.W.2d 760, 764 (Wis. 1999)). The court stated that
such deference is only logical because the "cold record" was not sufficient to assess the trial
court's decision. Id.
153. Id. (citing Kiernan, 596 N.W.2d at 764; State v. Faucher, 596 N.W.2d 770, 780 (Wis.
1999)).
154. Id. (citing Faucher, 596 N.W.2d at 779).
155. Id. (quoting State v. Ferron, 579 N.W.2d 654, 662 (Wis. 1998)).
156. Id. at 244 (citing State v. Erickson, 596 N.W.2d 749, 759 (Wis. 1999); Faucher, 596
N.W.2d at 784). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals clarified that the court in Ferron had
overturned the trial court's determination because the facts were unique. See id. They
involved the constitutional right not to testify upon one's behalf. See id. Therefore, the case
did not demand that prospective jurors give unequivocal assertions during voir dire. See id.
157. Id. In Faucher, the juror was acquainted with the State's key witness and trusted
her fully. Id. (citing Faucher, 596 N.W.2d at 774). This is an example of a juror having a
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The court in Oswald held that none of the jurors were biased;
therefore, the court upheld the trial court's determination."' Defendant
Oswald had argued that five jurors were either subjectively or
objectively biased.'59
One juror testified that she had formed the opinion that Oswald was
guilty; she had seen the shootout twice on television."W Another juror
stated that she could "probably" listen to the evidence with an open
mind.' Oswald claimed that these were both evidence of subjective
bias."2
Oswald claimed that a second juror was both subjectively and
objectively biased." Oswald argued that the juror's statement that after
viewing the television reports she knew either he or his son had done
the crime was an indication of subjective bias." Additionally, Oswald
claimed that the fact that the juror's husband was a police officer
resulted in objective bias.'6
A third juror stated that he would try his best to listen to evidence
and not determine the outcome based upon the media coverage.:
Oswald argued this was subjective bias.'67 Also, the juror was an
immigration officer, which Oswald argued resulted in objective bias."
Finally, the last two jurors were challenged based upon familial ties to a
police officer and responses to questions indicating subjective bias,
respectively. 69
The court held that Oswald had not demonstrated that the trial
court's determination regarding subjective bias was erroneous.10 The
direct connection with crucial evidence at trial. Id. Conversely, a juror's connection to
evidence is not indicative of bias if the connection is remote. Id. at 244-45 (citing Erickson,
596 N.W.2d at 753). Objective bias also occurs when a juror has a direct connection to the
main issue in a case (e.g., the defense theory). Id. at 245 (citing Kiernan, 596 N.W.2d at 766-
67). Finally, general dislike of the system will render a juror objectively biased (e.g., jurors
convicted of past crimes). Id. (citing State v. Mendoza, 596 N.W.2d 736,739 (Wis. 1999)).
158. Id. at 248.
159. Id. at 246.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 246.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See id. at 246.
167. Id. at 246-47.
168. Id. at 247.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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court also concluded that certain jurors' ties to the police community
were not sufficient to render them incapable of impartiality.' The
court, therefore, concluded that these jurors were not objectively
biased .
The court also took the opportunity to distinguish the case from
Faucher. The court stated that the Faucher juror had known the State's
sole key witness and that the issue at trial was one of credibility
regarding this particular witness.' Conversely, in Oswald, the juror that
stated she thought police were "more truthful" than others did not have
a personal relationship with any of the officers who testified in the case;
therefore, objective bias was not present.' 74
In State v. Jimmie, the defendant was convicted of three counts of
first-degree sexual assault and three counts of incest with a child.175 The
jurors had been asked if anyone had a family member or friend that had
been a victim of a sexual assault.'7 6 One juror stated that his wife had
been a victim of sexual assault as a child." The juror told the judge that
he thought he could set aside his wife's experience in the interest of
fairness during trial.'78  Jimmie's counsel asked the juror further
questions that demonstrated "some hesitancy" in his impartiality, yet,
the trial judge denied dismissal for cause.'
The court summarized the previous holdings and concluded that
objective bias was a mixed question of fact and law.'O The court held
that the juror did not exhibit subjective bias, based on the trial court's
superior position in determining a juror's honesty and credibility."'
Finally, the court upheld the trial court's ruling regarding objective bias
comparing the case to Erickson and finding no evidence of objectivebias. '82
171. Id.
172. Id. at 247-48. The court stated this case was not similar to Mendoza because
familial relationships with police officers are not the same as ingrained negative attitudes
towards the criminal justice system. Id. at 248.
173. Id. (citing State v. Faucher, 596 N.W.2d 770, 785 (Wis. 1999)).
174. Id.
175. 606 N.W.2d 196, 198 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
176. See id. at 199.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 200-01.
180. Id. at 201 (citing State v. Faucher, 596 N.W.2d 770, 779 (Wis. 1999)).
181. Id. at 203. The court stated that "magical words" are not necessary to assess a
juror's impartiality. Id.
182. Id. at 204. The case was not similar to Faucher because the juror, unlike the one in
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IV. A SOLUTION TO THE CONFUSION REGARDING STANDARDS TO
REVIEW JUROR BIAS
Over the past decade, juror bias has become quite controversial in
Wisconsin. Ramos made a challenge for cause enough of a right to
result in automatic reversal.' Subsequently, the Ferron decision
attempted to make sense of cases leading up to and including Ramos.'"'
The most important decision in this line of cases is the Ferron
decision.'o Ferron finally developed a two-pronged test that answered
how appellate courts should review juror bias cases as well as how
circuit courts should decide cases initially.1" Prong one speaks to the
"willingness" of prospective jurors to set aside their beliefs (as judged
by a circuit court), while prong two only allows for reversal by an
appellate court if it finds that no reasonable juror in such circumstances
could be impartial."" The only problem with Ferron is the holding itself.
The court in Ferron failed to apply the two-part test it proscribed. It
held that the circuit court should have been reversed because the Fifth
Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination was not given
enough weight by the judge."" As Justice Bradley questioned in her
dissent, why is the Fifth Amendment right given more credence than the
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial?' 9 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
should not have reversed the circuit court's decision because the
discretion of the circuit court was key to that juror bias situation."° This
was a case where, under the two-pronged analysis, a juror could have
been impartial.
After the Ferron decision, in the summer of 1999, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court decided four important cases. 9' It appears as though the
Ferron two-prong standard somewhat diminished with the evolution of
Faucher, did not know any person in the case. Id. at 203. Neither was the case similar to
Kiernan, as the juror in Jimmie did not demonstrate any prejudice towards any aspect of the
case. Id.
183. See generally State v. Ramos, 564 N.W.2d 328 (Wis. 1997).
184. See generally State v. Ferron, 579 N.W.2d 654 (Wis. 1998); see also State v. Gesch,
482 N.W.2d 99 (Wis. 1992); State v. Louis, 457 N.W.2d 484 (Wis. 1990).
185. See Ferron, 579 N.W.2d at 654; see also supra Part II.D.
186. Id. at 661.
187. Id.
18& Id. at 662-64.
189. Ferron, 579 N.W.2d at 667 (Bradley J., dissenting).
190. See id.
191. See generally State v. Faucher, 596 N.W.2d 770 (Wis. 1999); State v. Erickson, 596
N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 1999); State v. Mendoza, 596 N.W.2d 736 (Wis. 1999); State v. Kiernan, 596
N.W.2d 760 (Wis. 1999).
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the terms "statutory," "objective," and "subjective" bias.'9 However,
these terms confuse appellate and circuit courts. As applied in Faucher,
"objective" and "subjective" bias have no clear differentiation.' 93
According to the Faucher court, a juror was biased because his answers
and demeanor evidenced that he was objectively biased.'94 It does not
make sense that an "objective" standard is utilized to judge the specifics
of an individual's thought process.
Common principles of law dictate that an "objective" standard is
based upon a reasonable man's beliefs, not a certain individual's
beliefs.95 According to Black's Law Dictionary, an objective standard is
"[a] legal standard that is based on conduct and perceptions external to
a particular person."' 96 Yet, the Faucher court attempted to probe the
mind of a juror with only a "cold" record to rely upon.'" This only takes
away circuit court discretion and offers appellate courts confusing
terminology.
Ferron is still alive in the recent case law.'98 The cases themselves
refer to the two-prong Ferron test because it is the best way to make
sense of appellate review pertaining to juror bias. But if the new terms
"statutory," "objective," and "subjective" bias are effective, why are
courts still relying upon Ferron?'9
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court has truly attempted to
clarify standards to review juror bias, the recent modifications only
confuse everyone in the legal profession. "Objective" and "subjective"
bias are better defined by the Wisconsin Supreme Court than applied.
Most importantly, the appellate and lower courts may be left confused.
It appears that in recent decisions the Wisconsin Court of Appeals
has dealt with the new terminology quite properly, thus resulting in just
19Z See generally Faucher, 596 N.W.2d at 770.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1413 (7th ed. 1999).
196. Id.
197. See Faucher, 596 N.W.2d at 770. The court in Faucher also stressed the importance
of a circuit court's discretion of a prospective juror's bias when discussing "subjective" bias;
however, the court failed to apply the same rationale with the "objective" bias (which still
looks at a subjective level of thought). See id.
198. See generally Faucher, 596 N.W.2d at 770; State v. Erickson, 596 N.W.2d 749 (Wis.
1999); State v. Mendoza, 596 N.W.2d 736 (Wis. 1999); State v. Kiernan, 596 N.W.2d 760 (Wis.
1999).
199. See Faucher, 596 N.W.2d at 775 (citing State v. Ferron, 579 N.W.2d 654 (Wis. 1998);
Kiernan, 596 N.W.2d at 764 (citing Ferron, 579 N.W.2d at 654); Erickson, 596 N.W.2d at 758
(citing Ferron, 579 N.W.2d 654 (Geske J., dissenting)).
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holdings affirming trial court discretion when warranted? ° However,
why change the standard of review regarding objective and subjective
bias when even objective bias deals with specific facts in a case that only
the trial judge can truly judge effectively? Although the cases indicate
that objective bias fits in a category and subjective bias fits in another
category, it is probable that the two overlap, because even objective bias
determinations may be steered by juror demeanor and tone. For
example, a "firmly held negative predisposition by the juror regarding
the justice system""1 is a type of objective bias, but such predisposition is
more often than not exhibited by specific, subjective-type responses
during voir dire as applied to an objective, reasonable man standard.
The two-prong Ferron test is the best solution to this confusing-but
critical-problem of juror bias. Ferron clearly described to the trial judge
what to do in determining bias and additionally provided appellate
courts that same methodology in checking the trial court's
determination. As Justice Bradley stated in her dissent (which Justice
Geske joined in pertinent part), "We should reserve imposing our own
view of the record to those cases where the circuit court's interpretation
has no support in the record or where the circuit court ignores its
duties." ' m If we use the Ferron test, but apply it carefully as Justice
Bradley suggested in her dissent, this area of law would be clarified
greatly in Wisconsin. The terms "statutory," "subjective," and
"objective" bias may be beneficial, but probably not as beneficial as
compared to the Ferron test employed alone.
V. CONCLUSION
Voir dire is a fundamental aspect of the jury trial. The Sixth
Amendment guarantees the right to an impartial jury, and this is only
possible if courts have proper guidance in determining bias. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court has struggled over the past decade to define
bias and determine when to properly overturn circuit court decisions
judging juror bias. The resolution in the cases decided in the summer of
1999 appeared to be a great alternative, and subsequent courts have
embraced the new terminology. However, the terminology as applied
200. See generally State v. Oswald, 606 N.W.2d 238 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999); State v.
Jimmie, 606 N.W.2d 196 (Wis. Ct. App.1999).
201. Jimmie, 606 N.W.2d at 201.
202. See Ferron, 579 N.W.2d at 667 (Bradley, J., dissenting). Justice Bradley agreed with
the application of the test, but found the application of it to the specific facts inoperable. See
id.
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only results in more confusion and analysis than necessary.
Alternatively, however, the Ferron standard should be utilized to lessen
confusion regarding voir dire in Wisconsin.
SARVENAZ J. RAISSI*
* The author would like to give special thanks to Assistant Attorney General Paul
Lundstenfor his tremendous assistance in the analysis of this issue. Additionally, the author
also thanks Professor Danial Blinka for sharing his general expertise in this area of the law.
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